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Summary 
Japan has traditionally assumed the role of regional representative in the leading 
mechanisms of global economic governance as the leading economic power in East 
Asia, historically speaking, and the only non-European/North American member of 
the G7/8. However, the rise of the G20, the inclusion of a number of Asian countries, 
and the supposed eclipse of the G7/8 represent considerable challenges to Japan’s 
role in global affairs and its position as a contemporary great power. So far, Japan 
has responded by making significant contributions to the Global Financial and 
Economic Crisis and the G20, but these contributions have at times been qualified 
and even contradictory. This article will explore the external and internal factors that 
have both encouraged and limited Japan’s behavior within the G20 to date. 
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Introduction 
Historically speaking, Japan has traditionally assumed the role of regional 
representative in the leading mechanisms of global economic governance as the 
leading economic power in East Asia and the only non-European/North American 
member of the Group of 7/8 (G7/8). However, the rise of the Group of 20 (G20), the 
inclusion of a number of Asian countries therein, and the supposed eclipse of the 
G7/8 represent considerable practical and conceptional challenges to Japan’s role. 
These not only relate to Japan’s traditional regional role but also to the country’s 
position in global affairs as a contemporary great power defined not only by material 
and ideational power resources but also, in the tradition of the English School, by its 
sense of responsibility. So far, Japan has responded to these challenges by making 
important contributions to the G20 process and its initial handling of the Global 
Financial and Economic Crisis (GFEC). Yet, although significant, Japan’s behavior 
has at times appeared to be qualified and even contradictory. It raises doubts as to 
Japan’s status as a contemporary great power. 
The aim of this article is to make sense of these recent developments and to explain 
how they intersect with Japan’s behavior. It does so by first of all outlining the 
emergence and development of GX summitry in recent years before then 
highlighting Japan’s role in and its contributions to the G20 process since 2008.  
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The article’s focus then shifts to exploring the push and pull factors, both 
international and domestic, which have motivated these contributions but resulted in 
qualification and contradiction. In conclusion, it argues that rather than simply being 
a reactionary status-quo power, it would be more accurate to describe Japan as a 
reform-minded status-quo power whose efforts have been stymied by an absence of 
political leadership. 
The changing world order, GX summitry, and Japan 
The current period of change in the world order is seen to manifest itself in a number 
of ways. These include the eventual rise of genuine multipolarity with the decline in 
influence and power of the West and the rise of a number of countries collectively 
and often unhelpfully grouped together under the acronym of BRICS: Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The debates surrounding the origins, nature, 
and extent of this changing world order have been going on for some time. 
However, the GFEC that began in 2008 is seen to be the catalyst responsible for the 
acceleration of these underlying processes, particularly in terms of the distribution of 
economic power, as outlined in detail in Chan’s contribution to this special issue. 
One of the most salient symptoms of these tectonic power shifts is the rise of the 
G20 and the decline of the G8. The G7/8 was regarded as ineffective in responding 
to the outbreak of the GFEC chiefly because of its exclusive membership. In its 
place, the G20, freshly upgraded from the finance ministers’ level to the leaders’ 
level, was the vehicle of choice in addressing the crisis, largely because the right 
countries were seen to be seated around the table this time. Whereas the G8 
represents 66 percent of global economic output but only 14 percent of the world’s 
population, in contrast, the G20 represents 90 percent of global economic output and 
67 percent of the population. In short, the G7/8 paid the price for its failure by losing 
its position at the pinnacle of global governance to the more relevant, legitimate, and 
effective G20. 
However, this popular narrative is oversimplified, to say the least. On the one hand, 
despite its future existence being called into question, the G7/8 continues to meet 
and has not faded away completely. On the other hand, in contrast to its self-
appointment as the “premier forum for international economic cooperation,” it was 
not long before the G20’s own effectiveness and legitimacy came to be the subject 
of scrutiny with successive summits hijacked by the single issue of the euro-zone 
crisis and countries outside of the putative twenty calling for representation. As a 
result, a number of leaders including US President Barack Obama have lost their 
initial enthusiasm for a disparate and unwieldy group like the G20 and have 
rediscovered the benefits of a more intimate and like-minded forum like the G7/8 
(Cooper 2011; Bayne 2013). Some have even gone as far as to suggest that it is in 
fact the G7 that has successfully socialized the rising powers into its priorities and 
norms (see Chan in this special issue). In short, reports of the G7/8’s death have 
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been greatly exaggerated, and the G20 has not proved to be the panacea to all our 
global economic governance problems. The result has been a rather “messy 
multilateralism,” especially in terms of the institutional architecture of global 
governance, as evidenced by a proliferation in actual and imagined alphanumeric 
configurations ranging from a G2 to a “G192,” for which “GX summitry” provides a 
useful shorthand. 
These power shifts and their impact on the mechanisms of global governance have 
already been explored from a number of perspectives — from the viewpoint of the 
rising powers, especially China, through to the future evolution of the G20 and its 
relationship with the more established and legalized international organizations. 
However, the perspectives of the traditional great powers, which are seen to be in 
either absolute or relative decline as a result of the changing world order, have 
largely been overlooked. When attention has been focused on them, it has tended to 
be on the United States (US) and Europe; Japan appears to be a mere afterthought. 
Equally, the discussion focuses on material power resources rather than ideational 
resources or the defining sense of responsibility associated with great powers. 
This is unfortunate for two reasons. First, the very “fact” of Japan’s generally 
accepted decline is open to question. Second, the experiences of declining but still 
systemically important contemporary great powers seeking to maintain the status 
quo in some shape and form can be edifying in understanding the current shifts and 
future developments in world order (for a detailed discussion of Japan’s experience, 
see Dobson 2012a). Equally, focusing solely on material power resources ignores 
the alternative options available to great powers in maintaining the status quo as 
well as other motivating factors. In the case of the G20, upon closer examination it 
becomes clear that Japan’s contributions have been central to a number of the 
group’s successes so far. However, a number of encouraging and limiting factors 
that have shaped Japan’s responses have also resulted in frustrations and 
contradictions on the part of Japanese policymakers. Before moving on to explore 
these factors and their interplay in more detail, let us take a few moments to outline 
Japan’s participation in and contribution to the G20 up until 2013. 
Japan’s role and contribution to G20 summitry 
As mentioned above, the G20 was upgraded from a finance ministers’ meeting to a 
gathering of government leaders in November 2008 in Washington. Following the 
model provided by the G7/8, its initial concern with macroeconomic issues, its 
agenda, membership, and order of hosting evolved organically. As a result, whilst 
finance ministerial meetings continued, the G20 met a further six times at the 
leaders’ level: in London (April 2009), Pittsburgh (September 2009), Toronto (June 
2010), Seoul (November 2010), Cannes (November 2011), and Los Cabos (June 
2012). By 2011, the dust had settled on the GFEC to the extent that the G20 met 
annually rather than biannually and a future schedule of hosts was decided. At the 
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time of writing, the eighth G20 summit is scheduled to take place in St. Petersburg 
in September 2013. 
Looking across this period of time, Japan’s contributions to the development of the 
G20 and its responses to the GFEC may not be immediately obvious. Yet they are 
nevertheless of crucial importance to the success of some summits both in terms of 
boosting its material power resources and providing ideational resources. They 
ultimately demonstrate Japan’s sense of responsibility as a contemporary great 
power. For example, at the first summit of the G20 leaders in November 2008, 
Prime Minister Aso Taro sought to share the experience and lessons of Japan’s lost 
decades of the 1990s and 2000s with the G20 leaders, as explained in Aso’s post-
summit press conference: 
I have felt very keenly the weightiness of the role that Japan is expected to play, and 
the role that Japan must fulfill. One of those roles is to present Japan’s experiences. 
The experience of the collapse of the bubble and of overcoming it. Japan overcame 
that major crisis all by itself, of course also with major sacrifice. The other role is for 
Japan to take the lead in the building of a new framework. In order to respond to such 
expectations I made some concrete proposals, and I believe they have been reflected in 
the leaders’ declaration today (Kantei 2008). 
As regards taking a lead, after the summiteers had returned home, Japan was one of 
the few countries to honor the anti-protectionist pledges of the G20, unlike some of 
its regional neighbors and newcomers to GX summitry (Kirton 2009). 
Japan was frustrated in its attempts to secure the role of G20 host and enjoy the 
benefits that accrue in terms of shaping the summit’s agenda and direction. 
Nevertheless, Aso continued to take an active leadership role at the 2009 London 
Summit, with the highlight being his readiness to extend one of the biggest loans in 
history — US$100 billion — to the international financial institutions (IFIs), thereby 
supporting the central role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in resolving 
the crisis. He continued to provide the G20 with an understanding of Japan’s past 
experiences and in the process received praise from the other summiteers, especially 
from the host, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown. Thus, Japan’s contribution to the 
first two G20 summits appears to be that of a committed great power of the day in 
terms of material and ideational resources as well as demonstrating its sense of 
responsibility to international society. During this period, however, Aso also sought 
to make the case for the continued existence of the G8 by stressing the shared 
principles and values that lay at the heart of the G8 but were missing from the 
expanded forum of the G20. Thus, his support for the G20 was inevitably qualified 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009). 
A month after the Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) landslide victory over the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the Lower House election of August 30, 2009, 
Hatoyama Yukio was plunged into the diplomatic spotlight when he attended the 
Pittsburgh Summit of the G20, the United Nations Security Council Summit on 
Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament, and the opening of the 64th 
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session of the United Nations General Summit. As a result of pre-election fears in 
the US as regards the DPJ’s level of commitment to the US bilateral relationship, 
attention was focused firmly on the Hatoyama–Obama relationship for any telltale 
signs of the state of the relationship. However, maintaining continuity in the 
relationship despite any change in government was the order of the day, and this was 
also the case in Hatoyama’s defense of the utility and necessity of the G8 despite the 
rise of the G20, which followed the same script as Aso’s (Kantei 2009). Thus, it was 
an emphasis on continuity that was chiefly in evidence. 
Hatoyama’s tenure as prime minister was short-lived, however, and in June 2010 he 
was replaced by Kan Naoto, who attended his first G8 and G20 summits when they 
were held back-to-back in Canada the same month. At these summits, Kan expended 
considerable time and effort in explaining the New Growth Strategy and Fiscal 
Management Strategy, which he had developed when serving as finance minister. 
He furthermore stressed “the need to pursue economic growth and fiscal recon-
struction in tandem” (Kantei 2010). Kan claimed the strategy’s inclusion in summit 
discussions and documentation as evidence of his own successful contribution to the 
summit. At the same time, he pursued a strong G8 statement condemning North 
Korea and its sinking of a South Korean warship. Whilst successful in these aims of 
shaping the agenda and resulting summit statements, Kan was also keen to ensure 
the continued existence of the G8. He argued for a division of labor that emphasized 
the G8 as the place for communication between leading countries and the G20 as the 
place for coordination with developing nations (Yomiuri Shinbun 2010). 
Unexpectedly, he even went off-track: independently of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) bureaucrats and in contradiction of the shared democratic principles 
binding the G8 together, he proposed that China be invited to its meetings in order to 
bolster the legitimacy of summit discussions (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 2010). 
The first G20 summit in Asia was held in Seoul in November 2010 and provided the 
South Korean hosts with an opportunity to play a global governance leadership role 
(Cherry and Dobson 2012). Little Asian cooperation or coordination was in evidence 
ahead of the summit, however; competition and conflict were actually more salient. 
As part of the currency wars that characterized the run-up to the summit, for 
example, both Kan and his finance minister Noda Yoshihiko were openly critical of 
South Korea and China, accusing them of artificially manipulating their currencies 
in contravention of the principles and agreements of the G20 (The Japan Times 
2010a, 2010b). The summiteers attempted to paper over these divisions and focus on 
a number of more concrete outcomes including an emphasis on development and an 
agreement on reform of the IMF. Japan was supportive of this issue, having 
championed the cause of addressing imbalances in IMF and World Bank quotas and 
associated voting rights since the 1980s (Rapkin et al. 1997). Kan managed to 
survive as prime minister for almost another year in the face of the triple disasters of 
3/11, but he was eventually replaced by Noda. 
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The Cannes Summit was Noda’s first as prime minister and turned out to be a 
modest success. He was familiar with GX summitry, having previously represented 
Japan as finance minister under Kan, and although the summit was dominated by the 
euro-zone crisis and discussion of a financial transaction tax, he attempted to use the 
meeting to address the subjects of volatility in the currency markets and the high 
value of the yen. Noda also chose this summit as the venue at which to make a 
public commitment to introduce legislation raising Japan’s consumption tax to ten 
percent by the mid-2010s as part of a range of efforts to demonstrate to the outside 
world that Japan was keeping its house in order. These were well received by other 
G20 leaders. On the issue of free trade and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Noda cited 
the need for intra-party discussion before a final decision could be made. With 
regard to a financial transaction tax, he appeared to be open to the idea and 
expressed his intention to explore it in more detail before reaching a decision. As a 
result, and compared to his predecessors, Noda managed to surprise summit 
observers by taking a more proactive role (Tiberghien 2011a). 
The Los Cabos Summit provided another G20 summit that was overshadowed by 
events in the euro zone. In this context, Noda was eager to encourage Europe to 
improve its fiscal performance, to warn against any resulting contagion in the East 
Asian region, to explain the measures taken since Cannes to improve Japan’s fiscal 
health, and to deliver on his pledge to increase the country’s consumption tax. 
Whilst promising to provide a new US$60 billion credit line for the IMF, Noda was 
also eager to try and draw the summit’s attention away from Europe to focus on 
issues such as the appreciation of the yen (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). Thus, 
Japan’s contributions were more modest than had been the case at the earlier 
summits when the G20 was in crisis mode in dealing with the GFEC. Instead, media 
attention was focused on Noda’s bilateral meetings with fellow G20 leaders, and 
particularly on his first meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and their 
agreement to “reactivate” talks regarding the territorial dispute between the two 
counties (The Japan Times 2012). By the end of the year, Noda and the DPJ had 
suffered electoral near-annihilation — a worse defeat, in fact, than what they had 
inflicted on the LDP three years earlier. 
It can thus be concluded that Japan has made a number of contributions to G20 
summitry, ranging from the material (demonstrating Japan’s traditional use of the 
economic means of foreign policy) to the ideational (contributing to the summit 
agenda as well as resulting statements and commitments). However, these contri-
butions have inevitably waxed and waned as the G20 summit itself has developed 
from a crisis committee to a steering committee and back again. Equally, these 
contributions have sometimes appeared qualified (for example, Japanese perceptions 
of the utility of the G20 and the degree of coordination with its Asian neighbors) or 
even contradictory (such as Kan’s proposal to invite China to participate). In order 
to discuss the factors that motivated Japan’s contribution to the G20, let us now 
explore the international and domestic factors that have shaped this situation. 
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International factors 
Two normative factors in particular have informed Japan’s multilateral role broadly 
speaking but also historically in the case of G8 summitry (for a detailed discussion, 
see Dobson 2004: 165–184). Although originating internationally, they have been 
adopted by policymaking actors within Japan and provide the context to 
understanding Japan’s motivations in the G20. The first normative factor is the 
expectation that Japan, as the only non-European/North American member of the 
G8, will respond to its regional leadership responsibilities and assume the role of 
Asia’s representative. This has actually manifested itself in a number of initiatives 
and behaviors. On the one hand, the Japanese government has made repeated 
attempts in the past to expand the number of G8 summit participants (although 
stopping some way short of full membership) to include Asian voices from 
Australia, China, and Indonesia. On the other hand, successive Japanese prime 
ministers and MOFA officials have sought to sound out and provide feedback to 
East Asian neighbors regarding summit discussions before and after the actual 
summits (Dobson 2004: 173–175). 
The expanded membership of the G20 has resulted in wider Asian representation. 
Now that Australia, China, India, Indonesia, and South Korea have all joined the 
summit table, there are five competitors who have all staked a claim to the role of 
Asia’s representative or a bridge between the developed and developing world 
(Dobson 2012b). In the case of the former, South Korea made the most of the 
opportunity presented by hosting the G20 summit in Seoul in November 2010. It 
presented itself in a leadership role with a vision based on its own development 
experience to communicate to the world. In the case of the latter, Australia has 
declared itself to be: 
[…] committed to consulting non-G20 member countries so their views can be consid-
ered by the G20. Australian ministers and senior officials conduct regular outreach with 
our neighbors in particular, to ensure that the decisions of the G20 reflect the needs of 
the region (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2011). 
Thus, Japan now finds its regional leadership role under threat. It has responded 
with attempts to preserve this role, such as openly questioning China’s and South 
Korea’s levels of commitment to the pledges made at G20 summits, as mentioned in 
the previous section, and by extension their sense of responsibility to the 
international community and ability to behave as contemporary great powers. At the 
same time, Japan has doggedly stuck to its identity as Asia’s representative, as seen 
in Aso’s attempt to link the outcomes of the first G20 Summit in Washington to the 
ASEAN+3 and East Asian Summits that were held the following month (in 
December 2008). However, the increase in Asian membership of the G20 has also 
resulted in a degree of increased coordination, if not cooperation. Although this 
cooperation was initially more aspirational than concrete and was overshadowed by 
the competition mentioned above, the future hosting of the G20 summit forces the 
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Asian members of the G20 into discussing and agreeing who is going to host the 
2016 Asian Summit. In addition, although sanguine in his evaluation of Asian 
cooperation in the G20, Tiberghien (2011b) has pointed us towards the case of all 
the Asian members of the G20, including Japan, cooperating in order to maintain an 
open global trading system. Thus, the realist lens of competition and national 
interest cannot sufficiently explain Japan’s response to the loss of its long-cherished 
role as Asia’s representative. 
As regards the second normative factor, Japan has sought in a number of 
intergovernmental, multilateral bodies to behave as a trusted member of 
international society that takes its responsibilities as a contemporary great power 
seriously (Hook et al. 2012: 313–321). The historical record of Japan’s actions 
within the G8 demonstrates the power of this normative factor with examples such 
as its high levels of compliance with summit pledges as well as its efforts in hosting 
consistently successful summits (Dobson 2004: 176–184). In theoretical terms, the 
motivation behind this behavior can be explained by the English School of 
International Relations’ emphasis on the sense of responsibility that defines a great 
power more than its power resources. Thus, to quote Morris’s (2011: 328–329) 
treatment of Hedley Bull’s work: 
[…] great powers are not just unusually powerful states, but collectively constitute an 
institution of international society. Accordingly, great powers must conform to certain 
behavioral expectations and in particular must “manage their relationships with one 
another in the interests of international order” […](Bull 1977: 202). In Bull’s classic 
formulation, great powers have “a special mission [as] [...] custodian[s] or trustees[s] 
of the interests of international society” and are required to “accept the duty, and are 
thought by others to have the duty, of modifying their policies in the light of the 
managerial responsibilities they bear” (Bull 1977: 202). 
This desire to manage relationships among fellow great powers for the benefit of 
international society can be seen in Japanese efforts and initiatives to ensure the 
success of the G20. However, Japan has also experienced frustration, most clearly 
demonstrated in its inability to secure the role of G20 chair so far. As a result, and as 
outlined above, Japan’s enthusiasm for the G20 has at times been qualified by 
simple national interest and a preference for the G8. It wants to see the G20 succeed 
but not at the expense of the G8, which in the eyes of Japanese policymakers should 
continue in some shape and form as a central forum of global governance. This will 
protect Japan’s traditional position as Asia’s representative and a contemporary 
great power within a more select elite. Thus, successive Japanese prime ministers 
have praised the role of the G20 (Kantei 2009). Yet at the same time they underlined 
the fact that the G8 continues to be important, citing the like-mindedness of G8 
leaders as the justifying factor for the G8’s continued existence based on the 
members’ shared belief in an “open, democratic society, dedicated to individual 
liberty and social advancement,” as stated in the original Declaration of the first 
Rambouillet Summit of the G7 (G8 Research Group 1975). 
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In the initial years of the G20’s existence, this strategy dovetailed neatly with the 
LDP’s emphasis on values-oriented diplomacy, as signified by the Arc of Freedom 
and Prosperity initiative. The strategy was, to a large extent, inherited by DPJ prime 
ministers in their attempts to justify the G8’s continued existence (Dobson 2012a). 
Only under Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko was this strategy abandoned for a time. 
However, with the return of the LDP — and particularly Abe Shinzo and Aso Taro, 
the originators and propagators of the original values-oriented diplomacy — a return 
to this emphasis in Japan’s foreign policy and approach to GX summitry is already 
emerging. 
Japan is not alone in seeking to carve out a role for the G8 within the architecture of 
global governance, and specifically in relation to the G20. UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron has sought to engage in a similar task, as seen in his vision for his 
presidency of the G8 in 2013 and his role as host of the Loch Erne Summit: 
Some people ask: does the G8 still matter when we have a G20? My answer is “Yes.” 
The G8 is a group of like-minded nations who share a belief in free enterprise as the 
best route to growth. And as eight countries making up around half of the world’s en-
tire GDP, the standards we set, the commitments we make and the steps we take can 
help solve vital global issues, fire up economies and drive prosperity all over the world 
(Number 10, 2012). 
Although many Japanese policymakers would welcome these words, they should not 
be regarded as unqualified support for Japan’s position. Cameron’s statement also 
highlights a slightly different tack from that adopted by the Japanese government in 
carving out and justifying a role for the G8. The Japanese approach has been based 
on emphasizing the ideological glue that binds the G8 together, whereas Cameron’s 
onus is placed on the function (setting standards) and issue area, with only a nod in 
the direction of the G8’s shared values. In any case, debates surrounding the future 
division of labor and/or function between the G8 and G20 are likely to continue for 
some time. 
Finally, the importance of the US to the future direction and success of GX 
summitry — as well as Japan’s behavior therein and foreign policy more generally 
— needs to be figured in as well (Dobson 2012c). In looking at Japan’s behavior 
within the G20 (and previously the G8), the desire to manage its central bilateral 
relationship and to ensure continued US engagement with the international 
community has been salient. It either dominated Japan’s objectives at particular 
summits or at least provided a constant background noise. 
Domestic factors 
Informal groupings like the G8 or G20 place a much greater emphasis on the role of 
individual leaders and the interpersonal relationships that they construct between 
and amongst each other. Since its inception, GX summitry has been founded on the 
potential of personal encounters within a community of like-minded leaders. 
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Obviously, the reality involves a considerable amount of bureaucratic assistance and 
preparation, but the central role is still played by the leader, i.e., the president, prime 
minister or chancellor. The way in which UK Prime Minister Tony Blair was able to 
place African issues on the G8’s agenda pays testament to the influence an individu-
al leader can exert in these kinds of informal fora. Thus, when seeking to understand 
the success or failure of any country’s summitry, the role of the leader is central. 
In the case of Japan, GX summitry has presented either opportunities or challenges. 
On the one hand, prime ministers regarded as proactive leaders, like Nakasone 
Yasuhiro and Koizumi Junichiro, embraced and successfully used the 
intimate/interpersonal nature of summitry and the potency of photo ops with the 
fellow leaders of the great powers of the day to achieve their goals. On the other 
hand, the weaker prime ministers, who have traditionally dominated Japan’s politics 
as figures resulting from factional compromise, have found this format challenging 
in a number of ways. For example, Kan’s suggestion to other leaders at the 2010 
Muskoka Summit that China be invited to join in G8 discussions diverged from the 
script carefully prepared by MOFA bureaucrats and resulted in mixed messages. 
Some leaders, however, have even found extemporization difficult; reflecting on his 
experience of hosting the 1979 Tokyo Summit, Ohira Masayoshi described feeling 
“naked — like a little child” (Putnam and Bayne 1987: 257). Numerous other 
examples exist (Dobson 2004: 140–153). Ultimately, the role of the Japanese prime 
minister has been captured in the media by three words beginning with S — smiling, 
sleeping, and silent (Yomiuri Shinbun 1983). 
The problem does not lie solely in the ability of the individual prime minister, but 
also in their increasingly short periods of tenure. This higher turnover rate of prime 
ministers has always existed to a degree in Japanese politics, yet it has come into 
stark relief in recent years. Again, Nakasone and Koizumi stand out as historical 
anomalies, but in the history of Japan’s participation in the G8, nineteen Japanese 
prime ministers have represented their country compared to four German chancel-
lors and seven US presidents (see Table 1). In the case of the seven G20 summits 
held since 2008, five Japanese prime ministers have attended, as compared with one 
German chancellor and two US presidents (see Table 2). Clearly, Japan does not 
display the same levels of consistency in representation that other countries enjoy 
and which is crucial to an informal mechanism of global governance that relies on 
nurturing interpersonal relationships. This inconsistency in personalia once led 
former Brazilian President Lula da Silva to comment that “it’s like that in Japan — 
you say ‘good morning’ to one Prime Minister and ‘good afternoon’ to a different 
one!” (Financial Times 2010). 
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Table 1: US, German, and Japanese leaders’ attendance at G7/8 summits,  
1975 to 2013 
Summit venue and year US president German chancellor Japanese prime minister 
Rambouillet 1975 
San Juan 1976 
Ford Miki 
London 1977 
Bonn 1978 
Fukuda 
Tokyo 1979 Ohira 
Venice 1980 
Carter 
(absent) 
Ottawa 1981 
Versailles 1982 
Schmidt 
Suzuki 
Williamsburg 1983 
London 1984 
Bonn 1985 
Tokyo 1986 
Venice 1987 
Nakasone 
Toronto 1988 
Reagan 
Takeshita 
Paris 1989 Uno 
Houston 1990 
London 1991 
Kaifu 
Munich 1992 
Bush 
Tokyo 1993 
Miyazawa 
Naples 1994 
Halifax 1995 
Murayama 
Lyon 1996 
Denver 1997 
Birmingham 1998 
Kohl 
Hashimoto 
Cologne 1999 Obuchi 
Okinawa 2000 
Clinton 
Mori 
Genoa 2001 
Kananaskis 2002 
Evian 2003 
Sea Island 2004 
Bush 
Schröder 
Koizumi 
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Summit venue and year US president German chancellor Japanese prime minister 
Gleneagles 2005  
St Petersburg 2006 
 
Heiligendamm 2007 Abe 
Toyako 2008 
 
Fukuda 
L’Aquila 2009 Aso 
Muskoka 2010 
Deauville 2011 
Kan 
Camp David 2012 Noda 
Loch Erne 2013 
Obama 
Merkel 
Abe 
Source: the author’s own compilation 
Table 2: US, German, and Japanese leaders’ attendance at G20 summits,  
2008 to 2013 
Summit venue and year US president German chancellor Japanese prime minister 
Washington 2008 Bush 
London 2009 
Aso 
Pittsburgh 2009 Hatoyama 
Toronto 2010 
Seoul 2010 
Kan 
Cannes 2011 
Los Cabos 2012 
Noda 
St Petersburg 2013 
Obama 
Merkel 
Abe 
Source: the author’s own compilation 
The reasoning leads us to the timely question of what one might expect of Prime 
Minister Abe Shinzo at his first G20 summit in St. Petersburg in September 2013. 
Despite any hints of consistency, it appears to be the case that Abe’s second period 
of administration is not simply a continuation of his previous one. The LDP under 
Abe is hardly a radically different party as a result of its bruising defeat in the 
above-mentioned 2009 election. The party has, however, learned some lessons from 
its experience of being out of power, resulting in it becoming a more successful (but 
not necessarily responsible) opposition party, a factor that contributed at least in 
some way to its most successful electoral victory ever in December 2012 (Pekkanen 
2013). One prominent example of the different emphasis in the current and previous 
Abe administration’s agenda is the three-pronged economic policy dubbed 
“Abenomics,” which contrasts with the earlier nationalistic one, “Towards a 
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Beautiful Country” (utsukushii kuni he). Regardless of whether “Abenomics” offers 
anything new or is simply Keynesian pump priming that threatens the independence 
of the Bank of Japan, it does demonstrate the LDP’s and Abe’s ability to learn from 
their previous mistakes.  
Looking at Abe’s experience of G8 summitry as an indicator of likely behavior 
provides little predictive power because Abe has only limited experience of G8 
summitry. He only attended the 2007 Heiligendamm Summit, and he played a 
relatively peripheral role in a summit that mainly focused on climate change. 
However, at the 2013 G8 Summit in Loch Erne in June 2013 and three months prior 
to the upcoming G20 Summit in St. Petersburg, Abe arrived with the chief task of 
explaining and justifying his much-vaunted “Abenomics.” In the past, Japanese 
leaders have often come to the G8 summits anticipating criticism and needed to be 
ready to explain or defend their position on the Japanese economy. The related fear 
has resulted at times in “gift-bearing diplomacy” (omiyage gaiko), a strategy of 
adopting policies immediately before the summit in order to pre-empt open criticism 
of Japan. This tradition has continued within the G20. For example, as mentioned 
above, Kan sought to explain his New Growth Strategy and Fiscal Management 
Strategy at the back-to-back G8/G20 summits in Canada in June 2010. Admittedly, 
Abe has to survive a House of Councilors election scheduled for July 2013 before he 
can attend his first G20 summit, but this should not prove to be a pitfall. Considering 
the amount of attention that “Abenomics” has garnered as an alternative to austerity, 
it is likely that Abe will follow suit and come to the G20 attempting to explain the 
substance of his eponymous approach. He can thus be expected to stake a claim to 
making an intellectual contribution to the G20’s agenda and role in steering the 
direction of the global economy. 
At first sight, the picture painted here may appear one-sided, as other actors are 
inevitably involved in preparations for the summit as well. In the case of Japan, the 
role of MOFA needs to be discussed, in particular for traditionally providing the 
sherpa who actively serves as the prime minister’s personal representative and 
conscientiously prepares the summit agenda in collaboration with other countries’ 
sherpas throughout the year preceding a summit. However, these kind of fora offer a 
rare opportunity for individuals to shape the summit agenda, as seen for example in 
UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s role in fostering intergovernmental 
coordination at the 2009 G20 Summit in London. Ultimately, in informal, elite-level 
summits like the G8 and G20, any country’s participation will stand or fall on the 
basis of its leader. Sadly, in the postwar period, Japan has suffered from both a 
leadership deficit and a “revolving door” of leaders as a result of its domestic 
political structures. In view of its recent history of alternating landslide elections, it 
is unlikely that Japan will discover the necessary consistency in its leadership any 
time soon, despite attempts to create the organizational structures within the 
Japanese government that might ensure successful participation in the summit 
regardless of the individual in power. 
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Conclusions 
To conclude, how can we make sense of Japan’s role in the new global economic 
governance and explain what it wants to achieve? Elsewhere in this special issue, 
Chan argues that despite the shift in economic power, the West is still dominant in 
terms of military, political, and social power. Moreover, the global financial system 
is resilient enough to resist the various challenges it faces and emerge even stronger. 
If this proves to be the case, then Japanese policymakers will no doubt celebrate. 
They will have made a number of important contributions to this outcome by (1) 
supporting and working towards the success of new mechanisms like the G20 
through the provision of material and ideational power resources; (2) at the same 
time reforming and strengthening the traditional institutions governing the global 
political economy like the IMF; and (3) refusing to prematurely pass a negative 
judgment on the future of the G8 and instead persuading fellow great powers of the 
day of the G8’s utility and worth, whilst seeking to socialize rising powers into the 
values of global summitry. 
This would be the ideal outcome for Japan. It is hardly what one would expect of a 
reactionary status-quo power in decline that seeks to preserve an outdated world 
order at any price. Rather, Japan is a reform-minded status-quo power. Within the 
current rebalancing of global power, Japan has pursued its strategies in a typically 
quiet and incremental fashion (Hook et al. 2012). However, both behaviors to this 
end in the G20 and the G8 have often lacked political leadership that can transcend 
the traditional normative impulses and articulate a clear vision of Japan’s future role 
in global governance. The result at times has been the qualified and contradictory 
behavior explored above. As is the case with many of Japan’s political, economic, 
and social ills, although it may not provide a silver bullet, an injection of leadership 
into global summitry would certainly do no harm. 
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